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Through most of its history America has been perceived as a predominantly
religious nation, with relatively high rates of church attendance, numerous public
expressions of piety, and a general assumption that civic and private virtue depend
on religious belief. The 1950's marked perhaps the peak of that diffuse religiosity,
when the idea of religious belief and observance was maximally honored, often
apart from commitment to any of its specific forms. Billboards urged citizens to
'Attend church this week," as though church-attendance were a self-evidently good
thing and as though it made little difference which church one attended, or why.
Although this kind of social piety might be thought mere conformism, and as
such lacking in substance, it was intended to symbolize certain realities. For one
thing it was intended to affirm that America was a nation of church-going and
God-fearing people, an affirmation of national commitment that transcended par-
ticular differences or particular examples of infidelity. For another, it was an
affirmation of the belief that morality itself, the basis without which any civilized
existence would be impossible, depended upon religion. Thus it was essential to
affirm that commitment as a way of affirming one's belief in the social contract
itself.
Although moral values are notoriously elusive of investigation, it also appears to
be the case that until the 1960's Americans held to a fairly general consensus on
such values, a consensus which was celebrated in political and civic rhetoric, ex-
tolled from a wide variety of pulpits, honored in the mass media, and to a great
extent perpetuated through formal education, both public and private. This con-
sensus included as its key factors the self-evident rightness of patriotism, self-
discipline, hard work, self-reliance, family stability, personal honesty, and sensual
self-restraint. However dishonored in practice, these virtues received consistent
public affirmation, and were usually thought of as based on religious belief.
From the beginning there has always been a fundamental ambivalence in
America about the degree to which the society is and should be what is now called
"pluralistic," that is, how wide a diversity of beliefs and practices are and may be
tolerated. That such ambivalence has been present from the beginning is evident
to anyone with even minimal knowledge of early American history. School children
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learn that the early settlers of New England came seeking religious freedom. As
they get a little older they also learn that those same settlers denied religious
freedom to others.
The temptation is to dismiss the Puritans as hypocrites. But in their own minds
they were totally consistent -there was a moral obligation to tolerate religious
truth, which not even kings could abridge; there was no obligation, and indeed no
right, to tolerate religious error. Put in more modern and more secular terms, the
earliest American settlers affirmed the desirability of greater freedom than existed
in the Old World, yet believed with equal conviction that society had to rest on a
common moral consensus. At various times in history this consensus has been
thought to exclude Quakers, Catholics, Jews, and other religious groups. Sooner or
later, however, excluded groups have been understood in such a way as to permit
them to be part of the consensus. Although most Americans would probably say
that there is full religious freedom in the country, certain practices dictated by
religious beliefs are in fact outlawed-polygamy, snake-handling, and the withhold-
ing of medical treatment from sick children are the most obvious examples.
Whether rightly or wrongly, most Americans prior to the 1960's probably
perceived a fundamental moral consensus underlying a variety of religious denom-
inations unequalled in world history in terms of number and diversity of beliefs.
Equally important, this consensus was assumed to embrace even the majority of
those who had no real religious belief. Relatively few public figures would admit to
such a condition, and nominal church affiliation-often with liberal groups such as
the Unitarians-was a way of concealing it. Direct attacks on the broadly conceived
"Judeo-Christian ethic" were rare, except perhaps in relatively protected and insu-
lated environments such as college campuses.
The 1960's and 1970's saw a definite decline in church membership and atten-
dance, sometimes a very sharp decline.' More important than the numerical
fluctuation, which has tended towards a rather irregular historical pattern, has
been the fact that a secular way of life is now more respectable in America that at
perhaps any time in the twentieth century-understanding secularism first in the
narrower sense of rejection of institutional religion and then in the broader sense
of making no claim of being guided by the teachings of the historical religions. Not
only do public figures now find it unnecessary to claim religious affiliation; in
certain segments of society such claims are becoming increasingly rare. A frankly
secularist stance enjoys a prestige equal to that of religious belief.
It would, however, be a mistake to understand what has happened in America
since about 1960 as merely a division between the churched and the unchurched.
The division, within each denomination, between what are often called, borrowing
the vocabulary of politics, "liberal" and "conservative" elements, has been equally
important. Although such divisions, in one form or another, have been a part of
American religious life almost from the beginning, they took on unusual sharpness
1. For a discussion of church membership and religious practice, see D. KELLY, WHY THE CONSER-
VATIVE CHURCHES ARE GROWING 8 (1973) and D. HOGE & D. ROOZEN, UNDERSTANDING CHURCH GROWTH
AND DECLINE, 1950-78 (1979).
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and deepening passion after 1960. To cite merely a few examples-the changes in
the Roman Catholic Church either mandated by the Second Vatican Council of
1962-65 or implemented in its name, the decision of the Episcopal Church to
ordain women to the priesthood and to authorize a new edition of the Book of
Common Prayer, disagreements within major Protestant bodies over the exact na-
ture of the authority of Scripture and the extent of its inerrancy, and possibly
widening divisions within Judaism over the authority of traditional religious laws
and practices.
In most of these cases it could be argued with cogency than the more "liberal"
groups came to be perceived as having perhaps more in common with secularists
outside their framework of formal religion than with the "conservatives" within
their own churches. Liberals have tended to emphasize a political agenda, for
example, which is critical of the American economic system and of America's role
in world affairs, an agenda shared in large measure with the secular left. Religious
liberals have tended to support, quite strongly, feminism, the movement for homo-
sexual rights, and much of what goes under the name of the "sexual revolution."
One major divergence between themselves and the religious conservatives is pre-
cisely their attitudes toward secular movements of social change, liberals being
inclined to recognize these as actual manifestations of the divine will, conservatives
seeing them as frontal assault on the Judeo-Christian ethic. Thus in 1980 certain
religious leaders could join with proclaimed secularists like the television producer
Norman Lear in issuing a public warning against the organization called the Moral
Majority. 2 The warning was issued in response to the widespread impression that,
as a new decade began, there was a "swing to the right" in which religious
conservatives were once against asserting what they regarded as traditional Ameri-
can values which had been transgressed.
The liberal critique of American society is in large measure the claim that,
while based on the ideal of total openness or "pluralism," in practice it has always
been more closed and monolithic than it should be. To what degree America was
intended originally to be totally "open" is itself an open question. Through much
of the nineteenth century there were legal restrictions on personal freedom which
today would be regarded as intolerable, slavery being only the most obvious exam-
ple. Among the Founding Fathers the commitment to civil liberties was not as
complete as in retrospect civil-libertarians find it useful to believe. 3 However,
history aside, it is the essence of the liberal position that the story of America is the
story of the gradual extension and unfolding of that pluralism, the full encom-
passment of more and more diverse groups and hitherto proscribed beliefs and
behavior. Liberty is regarded as capital which cannot simply be allowed to lie secure
but must always be expanded, often with considerable elements of risk. Although
many would have difficulty expressing the moral sources of that imperative, liber-
als are generally convinced that there exists a moral obligation on America to
broaden continually the limits of its tolerance. So far as racial, ethnic, and religious
2. A national letter went out over Lear's signature (copy in possession of the author).
3. L. LEvy, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963).
LIMITS OF PLURALISM
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
groups are concerned this point has, at least in principle, been won completely. It
has now been extended to other categories of people, such as women as a group,
who are assumed to have specific rights which must be guaranteed apart from the
guarantee of rights to all citizens; to cultural minorities like homosexuals; and to
all those who profess "deviant" ideas or ways of life. Both the reality of and the
potentiality for social conflict in these areas is, if anything, greater than it was with
respect to struggles for racial equality.
In general the liberal response to this conflict is to insist that it is based on a
misapprehension, which in turn is based on fear and insecurity. The purpose of an
extended pluralism, the liberal argument runs, is simply to extend the rights of
citizenship to all Americans, to remove all vestiges of inequality and injustice.
America means equality, so the argument runs, and only when the rights of
everyone are fully protected are the rights of anyone really secure. Resistance to
this is then deemed to originate from one of two causes-simple bigotry, the wish
to keep others in an inferior status; or unfounded fear that the extension of some
people's rights will result in the constriction of one's own.
Probably not since the days of slavery has American politics confronted issues
with moral roots running so deep as those now on the political agenda. Questions
like abortion, the relationship between men and women, and personal sexual
behavior are not easily dealt with in a political context, and instinctively politicians
in times past have tried to evade questions likely to touch such deep nerves. But
the commitment to a steadily expanding pluralism makes confrontation with such
questions unavoidable. With most traditional struggles over equality won at least in
principle, the new frontiers necessarily are defined in places hitherto inaccessible to
political intrusion.
This new phase of the struggle for equality will of necessity test the limits of
American pluralism in ways they have never been tested before. This will occur
(and indeed is already occurring) in part because it raises issues that go to the heart
of deeply held and fundamental moral beliefs which cannot be easily compromised
and where the mutual respect, which makes democratic dialogue possible, is often
lacking. (Abortion is an obvious example. Some people regard it as one of a
woman's most basic rights, others as the deliberate killing of a helpless human
being. In such circumstances there is not much room for "statesmanlike" solu-
tions.)
Another test of the limits of pluralism is the question as to what unifying
principle remains at the heart of a society as that society becomes more and more
diverse, especially in terms of accepted moral values. A society can tolerate a
certain number of positions which are antithetical to each other. Is there a limit
beyond which these antitheses become socially destructive? The moral revolution
since 1960 has tended to call into question, systematically, virtually one by one,
every settled belief from the past. It has now become a political question whether a
social order can survive based on no moral consensus. (To cite only the most
obvious question, what motivates people to obey the law, and to what extent, in the
absence of such a consensus?)
Thirdly, it is necessary to ask the question whether society can be indefinitely
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pluralistic, indefinitely tolerant of all points of view, while still maintaining genuine
equality among them all. At some point does the legitimization of some positions
necessarily require the constriction of others? It will be the purpose of this paper
to argue that, where fundamental values are involved, this is precisely the case, and
the question, which touches many areas of social life, will be considered primarily
from the point of view of those issues which touch directly or indirectly on
religious belief and practice.
II
THE WALL OF SEPARATION
The separationist clause of the First Amendment is admittedly very general in
nature, using only ten words, and as such is subject to a number of possible
interpretations. For some time after the ratification of the Constitution some of the
states continued to maintain relationships between church and state which later
constitutional doctrine would regard as unacceptable.
4
Thomas Jefferson's phrase, "wall of separation of church and state" was first
used, in passing, by the Supreme Court in 1878, 5 then resurrected after many
decades of neglect in 1947.6 Since the latter date it has come to be thought of as
the governing metaphor in the area of church-state relations, and it has come to be
the purpose of much litigation in that area of constitutional law to ferret out
systematically all signs of public support of religion.
Oddly, however, in an age when few traditional assumptions have been left
unchallenged, there has been relatively little discussion of why an absolute wall of
church-state separation is necessary. It remains one of the few basic principles still
treated as self-evidently true, even though it is far from self-evident that the First
Amendment mandates such a doctrine.
Mark DeWolfe Howe argued a double tradition of church-state separation in
American history: one essentially secular, deriving from Jefferson and James Madi-
son, and seeking to protect the public weal from the intrusion of religion; the
other older, derived from colonial figures like Roger Williams, wanting to insure
maximum freedom for the churches without government interference. Howe ar-
gued that the first strain has generally governed separationist thinking.
7
Judging from the rhetoric both of some of the Founding Fathers and of later
court decisions, commitment to the separationist dogma has its origins in the
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, an age highly conscious of the seemingly
"irrational" passions which religion could stir up, still suffering from the aftermath
of religious wars which had been common in the previous two centuries, persuaded
4. See, e.g., A. STOrES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950) (3 vols.); C. ANTIEAU, A.
DOWNEY, & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964); and S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1902).
5. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
6. McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
7. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6-7 (1962).
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that organized religion was almost the natural enemy of freedom.8 The principal
motive for absolute separation was to protect society from destructive religious
quarrels, which were deemed uniquely intense and dangerous.
Justice Hugo Black articulated the same viewpoint in 1952:
It was precisely because Eighteenth Century Americans were a religious people
divided into many fighting sects that we were given a constitutional mandate to
keep Church and State completely separate. Colonial history had already shown
that, here as elsewhere, sectarians entrusted with governmental power to further
their causes would sometimes torture, maim, and kill those they branded "heretics,"
"atheists," or "agnostics. ' '
Justice Felix Frankfurter had similarly warned that "the public school must keep
scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects,"' 0 and Justice Robert
Jackson had written, "If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any
of these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave
public education in shreds."' In cases involving religion, the courts have tended to
employ "sect" as a favorite synonym for organized religion, implying factionalized
conflict.
If, however, the peculiar horror in which the courts seem to hold religious
conflict can be seen as a holdover from eighteenth century history and attitudes, it
has assumed the character of an unquestioned assumption of eternal validity. Thus
Chief Justice Warren Burger could write in 1969:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are
normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but
political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect.' 2
A statement of this kind automatically invites the question "why." In an age
when the acceptable limits of political controversy have broadened considerably,
when freedom of speech is deemed necessarily to include the expression of many
divisive and potentially inflammatory ideas, it is not clear why disagreement along
religious lines should be held in peculiar horror. Arguably, in the America of the
1980's political divisions along the lines of race, economic status, even perhaps
gender, are actually and potentially more divisive than religious divisions. Fur-
thermore, it hardly seems consistent with the governing spirit of liberal democracy
to inhibit certain expressions of belief because these might be potentially divisive.
Supposedly such "divisiveness" is not only the price paid for a real democracy but
almost in a sense the very essence of that democracy, and it ought not to be the
business of the courts to protect society from such disruptions.
At present it remains unproven that religious division constitutes a uniquely
dangerous threat to political stability and, if it indeed is, that it is of such magni-
8. See, e.g., R. HEALY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 162, 211, 216-19, 225
(1962).
9. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1952).
10. McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1948).
11. Id., at 235
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
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tude as to require systematic vigilance by the courts against it. Both assumptions,
however, seem to lie behind the strict separationist position which the courts have
accepted in large measure.
The "wall of separation" is often presented as a high constitutional principle
which, perhaps reluctantly, the courts must apply even when regrettable inconven-
iences occur. Thus it is argued, for example, that if children attending a rural
parochial school on a cold winter's morning are given a ride on a public-school
bus, the entire American tradition of church-state separation is endangered.
It is worth noting that the pragmatic liberal mind does not ordinarily counte-
nance what seem like harsh conclusions in support of abstract principles. That
mind in fact prides itself on its ability to adjust principle (including law) to social
reality. For this reason alone it is unlikely that abstract principle of itself governs
the strict separationist position. In practice it appears that much of that position
has been carved out in response to pressures from sources which regard either
organized religion in general or specific religious groups as undesirable social
institutions. To an extent greater than is generally realized, the separationist
doctrine rests on anti-religious foundations.
That Thomas Jefferson and some other of the Founding Fathers felt this
hostility is well known. 13 However, it was built into law over the years in sometimes
surprising ways-not until 1978 did the Supreme Court invalidate a Tennessee law,
for example, prohibiting clergymen from holding public office.
14
The personal views of the judges are scarcely irrelevant to the question. As
indicated by his statement above, Justice Black, for one, seems to have regarded
religious believers as uniquely likely to torture, maim, and kill in the name of their
beliefs and thus to be needful of restraint from so doing. His son revealed that the
Justice regarded people who attended church as "hypocrites" and had a particular
dislike of the Catholic Church. (As a young lawyer in Alabama, Black successfully
represented a Methodist minister accused of killing a Catholic priest. The defen-
dant's guilt was not seriously in doubt, but Black exploited the anti-Catholic senti-
ments of the jurors. 15)
In several of the cases involving the question of public aid to religious schools,
the principle has been enunciated that the character of those schools is itself
objectionable. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"6 for example, Justice William 0. Douglas
stated that, while it was the purpose of the public schools to educate, it was the
purpose of Catholic schools to indoctrinate. 17 His source for this sweeping state-
ment was a book by a fundamentalist Protestant author claiming to make an
expos, of the Catholic Church. The book claimed, among other things, that
13. See, e.g., HEALY, supra note 8.
14. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
15. H. BLACK JR., MY FATHER, A REMEMBRANCE (1975); V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA
YEARS (1972).
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. Id., at 635.
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Catholic priests and religious teachers are not allowed to think, that parochial
schools represent a dangerous "foreign" influence in the United States, and that
they produce a disproportionate number of gangsters and juvenile delinquents.
The author concluded by recommending that Catholics not be allowed to teach in
public schools or hold high public office.' 8 In his extra-judicial writings Douglas
revealed that he was influenced by the anti-Catholic polemicist Paul Blanshard. 19
The suspicion that teachers in religious schools cannot be relied on to teach
even secular subjects in a proper manner was expressed by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Black in Lemon,20 bringing from Justice White the observation that
nothing in the judicial record actually showed that secular subjects were being
taught improperly.2 1 Justice Jackson wrote in Everson v. Board of Education22 "[o]ur
public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it
than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values."23
Prior to World War II church-state cases before the Supreme Court were
relatively rare. There was a spate of conscientious-objection cases at the start of
World War II. Since then, beginning in 1947, there has been a steady flow of
church-state cases, immeasurably broadening the scope of constitutional law in this
area. In general the courts have tended towards a strict separationist position.
24
The leading historian of the phenomenon has noted that for the most part
these cases were carefully chosen and prepared and were designed to establish
sweeping constitutional principles. Often they did not grow out of genuine social
conflicts so much as from the desire of the plaintiffs to make a philosophical point.
While skilled constitutional lawyers usually represented the plaintiffs, defendants'
lawyers, especially where public agencies like school boards were concerned, rarely
had much experience in constitutional matters and not infrequently had no particu-
lar commitment to the positions they were defending. In addition, strict separationists
were generally on the offensive, acting as plaintiffs in 53 of 67 major church-state
cases between 1951 and 1971.25
Three organizations played important roles in the long-term separationist strat-
egy: the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.), the American Jewish Congress
(A.J.C.), and Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church
and State (PO.A.U.), now Americans for Separation of Church and State.2 6 In all
three cases, besides constitutional principle, participants were at least sometimes
motivated by antipathy to the Catholic Church and by the belief that Catholic
schools are a pernicious influence in society. P.O.A.U. is the most obvious case-
dating back many years it had warned Americans, frequently in tones of alarm,
18. L. BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360-63, 364, 368, 370, 379-80 (1962).
19. W DOUGLAS, THE BIBLE AND THE SCHOOLS 50 (1966).
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618, 635-36 (1971).
21. Id., at 667.
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Id., at 23.
24. E SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE 9,
19, 21 (1976).
25. Id., at 30-33, 89, 106-11, 165, 349-50.
26. Id., at 31-33.
[Vol. 44: No. 2
Page 3: Spring 1981]
that the Catholic Church constituted a threat to democracy and that Catholics
could not be good Americans. 27 (Its rhetoric has moderated in recent years.) In one
case brought by the A.C.L.U., the plaintiff was a woman who believed that religious
education deforms minds in the same way that Chinese foot-binding deformed
womeis feet. 28 Leo Pfeffer, counsel for the A.J.C. and probably the most effective
separationist lawyer over the past thirty years, admits to a personal dislike of
Catholic schools, which he regards as undemocratic.
29
It is arguable that the strict separationist position, which was only adopted by
the courts after World War II, represents the triumph of those who regard
organized religion as an actual or potential danger to the Republic. As such it is
not an even-handed application of some principle of neutrality so much as it is the




As it applies to religion, the First Amendment contains two clauses, the second,
ensuring free exercise of religion, being only slightly shorter than the first. If the
extent of the separationist clause is in some doubt, the extent of the free-exercise
clause is not. From the beginning of the United States it has been clear that there
were to be no restrictions of religious liberty except in very extreme cases, such as
the Mormon practice of polygamy in the nineteenth century.
Liberal opinion has generally held that the two clauses are perfectly comple-
mentary to each other, that the separation clause is in fact a necessary prerequisite
of the free-exercise clause, since church-state entanglement would itself pose a
serious threat to religious liberty. However, in practice it has often been necessary
for the courts to choose between them, and a judicial policy of remaining vigilant
against church-state entanglement in practice often means the willingness to im-
pose, or to allow others to impose, burdens on the free exercise of religion.
The dilemma would be less acute under a regnant judicial philosophy which
regards the interpretation of the Constitution as a narrow and technical matter, in
which it is the business of the judges to expound the law as written, whatever
practical consequences might flow from that. However, for many years the reigning
judicial philosophy has concerned itself quite consciously with the real or potential
social affects of court decisions. The frequency with which the courts have shown a
willingness to permit disabilities in the exercise of religious freedom, for the sake
of maintaining strict separation, indicates what is often a deliberate choice on the
judges' part.
27. For an example of P.O.A.U. rhetoric, see C. LOWELL, THE GREAT CHURCH-STATE FRAUD (1973).
For a sample and refutation of such rhetoric over the span of a decade, see L. CREEDON & W FALCON,
UNITED FOR SEPARATION: P.A.O.U. ASSAULTS ON CATHOLICISM (1959).
28. SORAUF, supra note 20, at 135.
29. Pfeffer, The "Catholic" Catholic Problem, Commonweal, Aug. 1, 1975, at 302-03.
30. See the article by Francis Canavan in this issue, The Pluralist Game, 44:2 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB., Spring 1981, at 23.
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The most obvious example is public aid to religious schools. It would be
difficult to show that concrete harm comes to the body politic as a result of such
aid, or that such aid necessarily would deprive religious schools of their indepen-
dence. Countries with political structures comparable to the United States-
Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands, for example-have maintained such aid
programs for many years without serious ill effect.
The strict separationist argument rests rather on abstract principle-that such
aid is in itself bad, because it violates a self-evident principle. But the evident
correctness of the principle is precisely what is in question. When it does not rest
on abstract principle the argument against such aid is usually based on the fact that
some people object to the use of their taxes for purposes of which they disapprove
or in which they do not believe. But the Constitution provides no guarantee that
one's taxes will only be used in ways compatible with one's beliefs. Given the
immense size and complexity of the federal budget, virtually any taxpayer could
discover numerous uses of tax money of which he or she morally disapproves. It
appears to be only in the area of religion that the courts have recognized a
quasi-right of taxpayers to object to specific uses of their tax money.
Court decisions with regard to school aid have been somewhat inconsistent.
However, in general they have tended to forbid all direct or indirect forms of such
aid at the primary and secondary levels, while allowing it for the most part at the
level of colleges and universities.3 ' During the period when these cases were under
litigation, and particularly since about 1965, many private religious schools, espe-
cially those under Catholic auspices, closed because of financial pressures. If it is
assumed that church-operated schools are an important exercise of religious free-
dom, if it is assumed that by operating schools the churches are performing a vital
social service, and if it is recognized that parents who send their children to
religious schools are also taxpayers, it would seem that the state has a compelling
interest in seeing to it that these schools are as good as they can be and are not
starved for funds. The courts have in general tended to hold that people cannot
effectively exercise their rights if they lack the financial means to do so (thus, for
example, the provision of free legal services for indigent defendants). In the area
of religion, however, it often appears that the courts, from a separationist stand-
point, take a certain satisfaction in permitting as many financial burdens as possible
to develop. The general tendency in modern society is for the state to find ways of
aiding institutions which, even though private, are deemed worthy of survival, a
pattern which prevails from hospitals to zoos and includes symphony orchestras
and groups which provide contraceptive and abortion services. Religious schools
almost alone remain outside this pattern, often because they are regarded as social
institutions which should not survive or whose survival should be made difficult.
Along with school aid, the question of religious observances in the public
31. The principal Supreme Court cases are: Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1967); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, reh.
denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works
Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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schools has provided the bulk of the church-state cases of the past thirty-five years.
While there have been some seeming inconsistencies, in general the courts have
systematically banned all overt religious instruction, along with prayers, readings
from Scriptures, and religious symbolism. Reluctantly, they have allowed, under
certain circumstances, children in public schools to be released from regular classes
in order to attend religious instruction off school premises. 32
The religious elements banned from the schools have usually been studiously
non-denominational in character. Thus the courts have ruled not only against the
favoring of any particular religion but against the favoring of religion in general.
The schools are to be scrupulously neutral where matters of religion are con-
cerned.
How neutral they can be in practice is something which will be discussed later.
There are, however, certain other aspects of this position which are questionable.
Beginning in 1948, it has been a consistent claim by plaintiffs in separationist suits
that their rights are violated if religious observances, however generalized, are
imposed on them. One such early case, for example, held that even though
children receiving religious instruction in a public school left the regular classroom,
those who remained behind were subjected to embarrassment and possible ha-
rassment.33 However, on other occasions the Supreme Court has specifically said
that, in the words of Justice Jackson, "If we are to eliminate everything which is
objectionable to any of these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doc-
trines, we will leave public education in shreds."34 It sometimes appears in court
decisions that there exists a constitutional right on the part of non-believers to be
protected from unpalatable impositions of religious beliefs, but no corresponding
right on the part of believers to be protected from ideas which they find offensive.
The strict separationist position also seems incompatible with prevailing trends
in modern education. It was more defensible when schools were regarded as
having a primarily technical role-they were to teach young people skills like
reading, writing, and arithmetic, which could be seen as divorced from larger
questions of meaning and value. Now, however, schools tend to stress "total"
education and are seen as institutions which shape young people in myriad ways, of
which the strictly academic is only a part. Furthermore, it has been a general
tendency in modern education to hold that children should not be insulated from
controversial and even disturbing aspects of reality.
Given these views of education, any system which resolutely excludes religion is
already an anomaly. If the schools are regarded as helping to shape the child's
total world, then the exclusion of religion cannot help but shape a religionless
world. At the most formative period of their lives, children are in effect taught that
religion is unimportant or even perhaps false. They are habituated in modes of
thinking and feeling in which religion plays no part. Although the school may
32. The principal Supreme Court cases are: McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
33. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
34. Id., at 235.
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deliberately seek to introduce the child to "controversial" subjects, religion cannot
be one of these. The very exclusion itself has major symbolic importance.
Several remedies are proposed. One is that religion be taught as an academic
subject, rather like geography. But in practice this does not appear to be very
common and in any case does not have much bearing on an education which seeks
to prepare children for "life."
More common is the assertion that religious education is properly the business
of the family and the church. But this begs the question. Parents send their
children to school precisely because they feel incompetent to educate them at
home. And although strong family practice is probably an essential prerequisite for
instilling religious belief in a child, in many homes this practice may be relatively
inarticulate and unsophisticated. Churches have access to children for only a very
few hours a week, not in any way comparable to the time they spend in school.
There are many functions currently performed by the schools that might be
performed adequately by other agencies. When any of these is in fact relegated to
other agencies, the school is conveying to the child the idea that such is not really
important.
Cases in which strict separationism has been applied in such a way as seemingly
to limit religious freedom have become fairly common: Currently under appeal to
the Supreme Court is a case in which a federal circuit court permitted a student
organization to use campus facilities for a Bible-study group. 35 A district court 36
had originally upheld the university's decision to forbid such use. At another state
university, student religious groups are restricted in the number of meetings they
may hold on campus and are required to pay rent for the facilities, conditions not
imposed on other student groups. A state court upheld such restrictions and
granted university authorities the right to impose prior restraint on such meetings,
on the grounds that there was a "clear and present danger" of violation of the
establishment clause.
37
Such cases have arisen at a time when the overwhelming tendency of courts,
and of universities and colleges themselves, has been to expand the limits of
student freedom and to hold that all manner of "controversial" opinions have a
right to be heard. They have also arisen in an atmosphere in which the tendency of
courts has been to protect constitutional freedoms not only in narrowly procedural
ways but also by seeking to identify substantive violations of freedom which may




The theory of separationism holds that the state is and must be neutral in
matters of religion. But, as suggested previously, such neutrality is difficult to attain
35. Chess v. Widmar, 635 E2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,-U.S.-(1981).
36. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
37. Dittman v. Western Washington University, No. C79-1189W (WD. Wash., Feb. 28, 1980).
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in practice. There can be little doubt that present separationist safeguards do
insure government neutrality among religious groups-public policy does not seem
to favor Christians over Jews, for example, or Catholics over Protestants. However,
it is a more substantial question whether public policy can and does maintain
effective neutrality between religion and unbelief, between professed theism and
other kinds of faith which can be thought of as competing with it.
To maintain that such neutrality is possible seems to require postulating that
public policy is somehow arrived at in a "value-free" manner. Yet it would be
difficult to show any policies which are in fact completely neutral. At the lowest
level, certain policy decisions may be purely functional in that they merely involve
choices as to how to achieve particular goals. Yet the goals themselves, at a higher
level of policy-making, cannot be "value-free." Certain values may be assumed to
be commonly shared throughout the body politic. However, it is one of the
arguments of this paper that such common assumptions are becoming fewer in
number. Furthermore, even within the framework of common assumptions, im-
portant value judgments must often be made which involve sharp conflict.
A classic example, already alluded to, was the Supreme Court's 1878 decision
outlawing polygamy as practiced by Mormons in the Western United States. On
one level the decision was clearly a limitation on religious freedom. The Court
reached its decision by positing the existence of an over-riding value-the welfare
of society required the support of a stable, legal family in the traditional sense,
which polygamy would tend to undermine. (The court also made a distinction,
which proved not to be very useful, between freedom of religious beliefs on the
one hand and religious actions on the other, which might be restricted by law.38 )
The court assumed a commonly held value-the legally established nuclear family-
which was one of the givens of American society. Today there are many people
who would reject that given, and it seems likely that a similar case today might be
decided quite differently.
The common liberal argument for pluralism at this point asserts that the law
merely expands the limits of permissible belief and behavior. In the process no one
suffers; people may find certain ideas distasteful or invalid, but they are not
required to accept them, merely to tolerate them. With regard to polygamy, for
example, some people might be permitted in law to practice it, but others could
still enter into traditional marriages.
Such a philosophy is totally out of step with the overwhelming tendency of
modern government, however, which seems almost inevitably set on a course of
expansion of powers and expansion of the ways in which it intervenes in the lives
of its citizens. The minimal government envisioned by classical conservative theory
might conceivably claim the kind of neutrality which pluralism postulates. The
modern, activist, liberal, welfare state cannot be neutral and does not aim to be.
Public education, as already discussed, is a prime case in point. No responsible
educator would deny that education involves the making of countless value
judgments-in establishing curricula, choosing teachers, mandating textbooks, set-
38. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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ting goals, etc. Many of these judgments involve moral choices which may be
controversial. The very absence of religion is, as already argued, a judgment of this
kind. Contrary to the beliefs of many people, the courts and the schools have
decided that education is best carried out with no religious component at all.
One of the relatively few instances in which opponents of strict separationism
have taken the offensive in litigating constitutional questions has been recent cases
in which Protestants of the type generally called fundamentalist have sued school
districts to force the inclusion of biblical accounts of creation alongside the theory
of evolution in their curricula or, alternatively, to present evolution as merely a
theory rather than a fact. Plaintiffs contend that the teaching of evolution alone
violates their religious beliefs and also violates the required neutrality of the state.3 9
A more widespread and perhaps more sensitive area of conflict is over sex
education in the public schools. Such programs have become all but universal and
perhaps arouse more public controversy than any other aspect of education. The
standard argument in favor of such programs is that they are indeed neutral-they
merely impart information to students which is deemed appropriate for students
to have. But the very existence of such programs involves a value judgment, since
some parents oppose them on moral grounds and assert that sex education be-
longs to the domain of the family. Others would approve such programs, but only
if they included explicit moral guidance about sexual behavior. In reality, it appears
that many such programs aim at shaping children's values and attitudes with
regard to sex. The general assumption behind such programs is that being "sexu-
ally active" in a variety of ways is normal and healthy for young people and that the
schools should help them to do so safely and without guilt.4 Such aims conflict
directly with the moral and religious beliefs of many parents, who thus perceive
the schools as directly undermining their own attempts to inculcate values in their
children. Legal challenges to such programs have generally been unsuccessful. It is
not even clear that courts will recognize a general right of exemption from such
programs for children whose parents disapprove.4 1 In any case, in some of its
earlier decisions, the Supreme Court seemed to say that it is insufficient merely to
exempt certain children from programs which violate their consciences, since this
may single them out for ridicule and harassment.42
If the public schools are the most obvious place where values clash, they are by
no means the only cockpit. Abortion is another classic example. The liberal position-
that those who oppose abortion are free not to engage in it, while those who
approve it may do so-simply begs the question, since in the minds of anti-
abortionists they are being asked to countenance the massive taking of human life.
A possible compromise over the abortion issue would be to permit abortions to be
39. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Daniel v. Waiters, 515 E2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
40. For a critique of such programs, see Horner, Is the New Sex Education Going Too Far?, New
York Times Magazine, Dec. 7, 1980, at 137-48.
41. See, e.g., Cornwell v. State Board of Educ., 428 F2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942
(1970).
42. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227, 232 (1948).
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performed by private agencies but to keep the state scrupulously neutral. Virtually
no one, however, finds this acceptable. Pro-abortionists generally wish to see major
governmental support for the practice-it is regarded as an integral part of health
care, as well as an important tool in population control, and as such should be
promoted by publicly funded agencies both domestically and abroad. The modern
welfare state simply cannot remain neutral on such issues.
Recognizing this, suit was brought in federal court to invalidate the so-called
Hyde Amendment whereby Congress forbids most expenditures of public funds
for abortions. The major grounds for the suit was the claim that the law violated
church-state separation because it enacted the principles of particular religions,
notably the Roman Catholic Church. Under the so-called "divisiveness" doctrine,
the claim was made that any legislation which could be shown to have been
influenced primarily by religious believers was invalid because of its tendency to
promote religious conflict in society. Plaintiffs went to the length of reading the
mail of the congressional sponsor of the legislation, to determine the religious
affiliation of those who wrote to him, and of submitting an affidavit about his
personal religious practices. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argu-
ment.
43
Had it won acceptance, it would have had immensely far-reaching consequences,
since a great deal of legislation (for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 4 4 could
be shown to have been passed as a result of strong religious pressures. At some
level the divisiveness doctrine-the argument that certain kinds of state action are
forbidden simply because they tend to create religious controversy-is recognized
by the Supreme Court, however. It was enunciated by Chief Justice Burger in one
of the school-aid cases.45 The very fact that the issue is raised tends to demonstrate
the impossibility of the state's neutrality in matters of basic values.
Another point of conflict between the professed neutrality of the state and its
actual commitment to certain values is the question whether policies to which the
state is in principle committed may be enforced with regard to religious institutions
which claim exemption either in terms of religious freedom or church-state separa-
tion. The Supreme Court, by a narrow margin, has ruled that the National Labor
Relations Board does not have jurisdiction over teachers in religious schools. The
Catholic hierarchy argued in the case that to permit such a thing would be to
permit the government to intervene in disputes which might be of a purely
religious nature, e.g., a decision to dismiss a teacher for failing to teach Catholic
doctrine. 46 A Protestant school has successfully argued in a state court that regula-
tions imposed on the school by the state effectively interfered with religious free-
dom by restricting the school's right to set its curriculum and hire teachers in
43. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (copy of plaintiff's brief in possession of the
author).
44. For the importance of religious influence on legislation, see J. ADAMS, THE GROWING CHURCH
LOBBY IN WASHINGTON (1970). The Civil Rights Act is considered at 1-3.
45. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
46. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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accordance with its religious mission.4 7 Largely unlitigated, at least at the federal
level, is the question whether religious institutions, contrary to their professed
beliefs, would be prohibited from discriminating against classes of persons specially
protected by law, for example, by excluding women from the ranks of the clergy or
refusing to hire homosexuals as teachers.
It is worth noting that certain strict separationists do not altogether regard the
wall as excluding both sides equally. Leo Pfeffer, for example, notes that church
and state historically have sought to dominate each other, with the state usually
successful. 4 8 He also argues that some of the Supreme Court's decisions of the past
thirty years have made the "liberalization" of the Catholic Church more likely by
making parochial schools harder to maintain, thus helping those in the Church
who seek a "congregational" polity independent of hierarchical control. Pfeffer




Through most of American history, questions of church-state relations have
been fairly easy to define because there were few problems as to what constituted a
church. However, the First Amendment does not mention "church" but rather
"religion." Implicitly, therefore, it seems as though the amendment does not only
apply to formally organized groups which designate themselves as churches. America
has always been fruitful in producing new religions, and in the past twenty years
there has been a vast proliferation of them, the constitutional import of which is
not clear.
Insofar as newer religious movements can be readily identified as such there is
no problem, since presumably they have the same rights and are subject to the
same restraints as older and more established churches. The problem emerges
with respect to movements which may not declare themselves to be religions, and
may in fact even deny that they are, but which others understand to be. An issue
has arisen' which respect to the movement called Transcendental Meditation, whose
proponents claim that it is merely a technique for recollection and self-exploration,
while critics claim it is a religion actually or potentially in conflict with other
religions. Thus far Federal courts have upheld the critics.
50
A potentially much more divisive issue is over the "religion' of Secular Human-
ism. Many religious believers are convinced that there exists such a philosophy,
which is antithetical to theism, dismissing the latter's claims as illusory and hence as
47. Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Michigan Dept. of Educ., Cir. Ct., Mich., No. 80-26205-AZ
(Dec. 8, 1980).
48. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 727 (1953).
49. L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT AS REFEREE OF CHURCH-STATE
CONFRONTATION 49, 231, 250, 253, 348 (1975).
50. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
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personally and socially damaging to those who accept them. Secular Humanism
also advocates an approach to life in which human beings are encouraged to rely
entirely on their own powers and to live and act as though no divine being governs
the universe. Finally, certain practical consequences tend to flow from these theo-
retical beliefs-for example, Secular Humanists tend to reject the traditional, strict
Judeo-Christian moral code with regard to sex and to advocate "free" and "open"
attitudes towards sexuality which are morally objectionable to many religious believers.5 1
However, it is not the contention of critics that Secular Humanism is merely the
doctrine of a particular organization having relatively few members. They rather
contend that it is a widely held philosophy of life shared by many people, not all of
whom would even be familiar with the name. For purposes of the First Amend-
ment the contention is that Secular Humanism often functions as the governing
philosophy of many public schools and other public agencies and that it is not
subject to the same restraints in the name of separation that organized churches
are. Thus, the argument runs, religious believers suffer violation of their rights by
having an alien and unacceptable philosophy imposed on them. Thus far the
courts have shown no inclination to accept this argument. 2
That the courts should take the argument more seriously is suggested by the
fact that the Supreme Court, in establishing the criteria for valid conscientious
objection from military service, has itself declared Secular Humanism to be a
religion, entitled therefore to the same considerations and protections as all other
religions. In one such case the Court ruled that:
We believe that . . . the test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether
a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for exemption. 53
If Secular Humanism is indeed a religion for the Court's purposes, and if
religion is to be understood as the Court thus understands it, it seems to follow
that very difficult and profound questions are raised with respect to the duty of the
state to be vigilant against Secular Humanist intrusions into the public order in the
same way it is required to be vigilant against theistic intrusions. It is noteworthy
that no less a personage than Leo Pfeffer argues that the courts have indeed
enshrined Secular Humanism as the official creed.5 4
The issue raises once again the anomaly discussed in relation to the unex-
amined assumptions of the strict separationists, namely, why it is to be assumed
that theistic creeds alone, of all the schools of thought which contend with each
other in modern society, are to be singled out for special exclusions.
51. A convenient summary of secular humanist doctrine is found in AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIA-
TION, HUMANIST MANIFESTO I & II (1953, 1973).
52. See, e.g., Hobolth v. Greenway, 52 Mich. App. 682, 218 N.W2d 98 (1974); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki,
52 Haw. 436, 478 P2d 314 (1970).
53. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965). See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495 (1961).
54. Issues That Divide: The Triumph of Secular Humanism, 1977 J. OF CHuRcH & STATE 203-05.
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VI
PERSONAL CONSCIENCE VERSUS PUBLIC POLICY
Instinctively the liberal mind tends to uphold individual rights, especially those
based on conscience, when these conflict with law or government policy. A long
tradition holds that individual rights must be scrupulously respected, and even
dissent from law must be accommodated as much as possible.
It remains uncertain, however, how far the courts will go in permitting dissent
on religious grounds from firmly established law or public policy. Historically the
Supreme Court has gone fairly far in upholding the right of Jehovah's Witnesses,
for example, not to be compelled to salute the American flag 55 or of Amish
parents not to be forced to send their children to public schools. 56 However, as one
constitutional scholar has somewhat cynically suggested, the courts have a record of
solicitousness towards religious beliefs perceived as marginal and dissenting while
tending towards strictness and vigilance with respect to "mainline" beliefs.57
An acute area of conflict has been the growing tendency of some Protestants to
establish their own schools. Such establishments have come under attack by various
government agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service (charging improper
claims of tax exemption) and state departments of education demanding control of
accreditation. The results so far have been rather mixed. In each case, however, the
supporters of the schools in question claim that conscience, particularly relating to
freedom of religion, forbids them to enroll their children in public schools. 58 More
radical yet is the contention of some parents that the moral character of existing
schools requires them to educate their children at home, in accord with their own
beliefs. Again the judicial results have been mixed.59
Parents have also brought suit to overturn compulsory sex-education courses in
public schools, on the grounds that such courses violate the religious and moral
beliefs of the parents. Such claims have been disallowed.6 °
The practice of "deprogramming" of recruits to various religious sects also
raises questions of religious freedom which are far-reaching in their consequences.
On the one hand the state seems to have a clear obligation to protect those who are
tricked or coerced into joining groups which suppress their freedom, as in the
notorious case of the People's Temple of Rev. Jim Jones. However, in the nature of
things it is extremely difficult for the state to determine when an individual has
indeed been subjected to techniques which negate personal freedom, and the very
attempt to do so may have a "chilling" effect on religious liberty. Once the state
takes it upon itself to judge when religious conversions are genuine and when the
result of forced means, there would be no end to the necessary interference in
55. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
57. W BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 77-79 (1976).
58. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W2d 877 (Ky. 1979).
59. See, e.g., Michigan v. Noble, No. 5791-0115-A (1979).
60. Note 35, supra.
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matters of conscience and religious liberty.6' It is also worth noting in this connec-
tion that some modern sceptics believe that all religious commitment is by definition
irrational and therefore might be subject to automatic suspicion and review.
Attempts to "deprogram" members of religious cults are often brought by the
members' parents, and the whole area of parental authority is a sensitive one in
which the ground appears to be shifting. It is also a subject closely intertwined with
personal religious liberty, as indicated in the instances cited above in which parents
object on grounds of principle to what is taught in the public schools. The
Supreme Court has already ruled that minor children have a right to contraceptive
and abortion services without their parents' consent,62 a ruling which offends the
consciences of many parents not only in its substance but also in the way that it
seems to establish the authority of the state above that of the parent in a highly
sensitive and important area of life-the nurture of children. Some parents with
traditional beliefs fear that the state will indefinitely expand the scope of children's
rights so as to minimize parental authority, especially in the crucial area of moral
values, and that the state will commit itself to certain policies, e.g., the encourage-




As American society, often led by its courts, has greatly widened the limits of
permissible belief and behavior over the past twenty years, it has not simply
enriched the "pluralism" which has always been a feature of that society. In the
nature of things the decision to tolerate certain hitherto disapproved ideas or
actions has often required tightening restrictions on ideas or actions previously
considered orthodox. An indefinitely elastic pluralism is not possible. Expansions in
some areas are likely to cause contractions in others.
In particular the unofficially privileged place which organized religion has
traditionally enjoyed in American life has been eroded, often with active judicial
effort towards that end. The urge to ensure that non-belief does not suffer in
comparison with belief has often led to practical and theoretical restrictions being
placed on religion itself. The classical doctrine of strict separationism rests on an
assumption that the state can and must be neutral. But in practice this is impossi-
ble. Values are necessary for the functioning of any society, and if they are not
consciously adopted and publicly acknowledged they will be smuggled in surrepti-
tiously and often unconsciously. Values are always in real or potential conflict, and
the state inevitably favors some values over others.
61. Alexander v. Unification Church of America, 634 F2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980); Peterson v. Sorlien,
299 N.W2d 123 (Minn. 1980).
62. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Note, however, that the Court
has recently limited Danforth. Although it remains unconstitutional to legislate an irrevocable power to
parents to forbid their daughter's abortion, a state may require parental notification, when possible, of
an abortion to be performed on a dependent unmarried minor. H. L. v. Matheson, 49 U.S.L.W. 4255
(U.S. March 24, 1981) (No. 79-5903).
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